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Abstract 
This paper discusses epistemic aspects of populism – especially its link with radical 
uncertainty and the tribal construction of facts – that have so far received relatively 
little attention. We argue that populism is less a backward-looking phenomenon 
feeding off existing grievances than a narrative-based reaction to an increasingly 
unsettled future. Many economic factors isolated as causes of populism – especially 
rapid technological innovation, deregulation, and the globalisation of networks – entail 
a high degree of indeterminacy in social systems; and the corresponding uncertainty 
facing voters is a catalyst for many of the pathologies of populism isolated in the 
literature. In particular, uncertainty undermines the credibility of experts, while the 
disorientation and anxiety it induces increase reliance on simple narratives to structure 
expectations. The paper explores the role of narrative entrepreneurs, the relationship 
between narratives and power, and the dynamics of narrative coups designed to create 
alternative facts and perform a new reality.   
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The epistemics of populism and the politics 
of uncertainty 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a burgeoning literature on populism attempting to define its specific 
characteristics and its main drivers. This paper aims to complement this literature with 
a focus on several epistemic issues – in particular the relationship between populism 
and the incidence of economic uncertainty and the tribal construction of facts. In a 
nutshell, we isolate radical uncertainty about the future as a key antecedent for the 
populist turn and an important catalyst for many of its features. Our purpose is neither 
to discredit other accounts of populism nor to deny that populist voters may have 
legitimate grievances. But instead of focusing on backward-looking grievances, we 
stress the emotional and cognitive challenges all actors face in forming convincing 
expectations of the future at times of fundamental uncertainty. Our account sheds new 
light on how populist politicians leverage such voter confusion into durable support 
for themselves.  
Our main thesis is that the economic indeterminacy implied by radical technological 
or policy innovation, deregulation, and the emergence of novel outcomes from 
complex interconnected global networks – together with correspondingly high levels 
of uncertainty, insecurity, and anxiety experienced by citizens – provides fertile 
conditions for populist politics to take hold in modern capitalist economies. 
Heightened uncertainty forces all economic and social actors to rely on a combination 
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of imaginaries, narratives, and calculation to form expectations, shore up confidence, 
and make future-oriented decisions (Beckert and Bronk, 2018). Crucially, the 
indeterminacy of the future ensures that expectations cannot be firmly anchored in 
objective probability functions, while making it impossible to know whether current 
models of best practice will remain pertinent in future (Bronk and Jacoby, 2016). 
Moreover, since the narratives and imaginaries that structure expectations play an 
important role in influencing outcomes, the future belongs to those with the political, 
market, or rhetorical power to make their narratives and imaginaries count (Beckert, 
2016).  
Radical uncertainty and the openness of the indeterminate future to being shaped by 
novel imaginaries and convincing stories explain many features of modern economies: 
firms use public relations and advertising to establish the pre-eminence of their new 
era stories, while central banks manage market expectations with forward guidance 
(Holmes, 2014). We contend that the current prevalence of uncertainty also explains a 
renewed tendency for politics to resemble a battle of warring narratives – characterised 
by an arms race of rhetorical hyperbole and rival attempts to construct facts and 
envisage a future that will secure voter approval. Success may ultimately lie with 
leaders able to engineer what we call ‘narrative coups’ – the wholesale reshaping of 
both the guiding narratives of their electoral base and the framing normative or 
conceptual grids with which they interpret events and decide how to act. The 
indeterminacy of the future ensures that hard-fact constraints on these rhetorical 
coups are less binding than normally supposed, especially since experts are frequently 
discredited by failed attempts at accurate predictions. At the same time, the 
increasingly tribal construction of facts atomises the field of awareness, and dissolves 
the common reference points, of the electorate. 
This discussion paper aims to complement existing literature on the main drivers of 
the recent populist turn by hypothesising that the prevalence of radical economic 
uncertainty may be a predictor of the incidence of populism – both its geographic 
distribution and the demographic profile of support for populist politicians. Our paper 
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also helps explain the peculiar dynamics of populist politics with reference to the 
concepts of narrative coups and the tribal construction of facts. In doing so, it touches 
on a number of empirical examples from Europe and the USA and provides some 
discourse analytics. It does not, though, examine any particular case studies in the 
round. Nor does it seek to define the boundary conditions for what counts as 
populism. Indeed, it argues that many of the features isolated in the paper (such as 
reliance on simple narratives and reassuring promissory stories in conditions of 
uncertainty) are widespread phenomena in modern political economies. It is only 
when these techniques are employed with cynical intent to subvert the course of 
politics and grab power on a nakedly partisan prospectus in the name of the ‘real 
people’ that these features earn the pejorative label of ‘populist’.  
2. The nature and causes of populism 
As both the nature and causes of populism are the subject of a large literature, we only 
sketch those strands from which we draw inspiration in identifying populism as an 
exclusionary form of identity politics, characterised by simple narratives promising a 
return to a more certain age, combined with an arms race of rhetorical hyperbole and 
denigration of opponents and compromise. 
2.1 What is populism? 
Ever since Abraham Lincoln, it has been a commonplace to see democracy as 
‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’. The term ‘populism’ is 
widely used to refer to particular versions (or perversions) of this general principle. 
So, for example, Jan-Werner Müller (2016, 3) argues that populism is ‘an exclusionary 
form of identity politics’ where part of the population is considered as the ‘real people’ 
– a single, homogenous, and authentic body differentiated from the elite or other less 
worthy groups (including immigrants) excluded by virtue of their ethnicity, culture, 
or voting record.  Nigel Farage famously referred to the Leave victory in the 2016 EU 
referendum in the UK as a ‘victory for real people’ – implying, as Müller (2016, 22) 
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puts it, that ‘the 48% of the British electorate who had opposed taking the UK out of 
the European Union’ were ‘somehow less than real’ or were not true citizens. 
The populist leader – particularly in majoritarian democracies – is then the champion 
of the ‘will of the people’ (in this case expressed in a one-off referendum) against a 
variety of ‘enemies of the people’ – including judges, legislators, or the media – and 
battling the elite, shadowy groups of outsiders, or reviled ‘citizens of nowhere’.1 To 
honour a majority verdict is not in itself, of course, to earn the soubriquet of ‘populist’ 
since it is part of the very essence of democracy; rather the populist is someone who 
rides roughshod over the checks and balances in the constitution that were designed 
to ensure deliberative action, protect due process, and safeguard the rights and 
concerns of minorities.  Populists advocate what Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill, and 
others label the ‘tyranny of the majority’. 
We follow Müller in seeing populism as essentially an approach to politics and a set of 
political techniques employed to secure power in the name of ‘the people’ rather than as 
a set of particular policy responses to more or less legitimate social and economic 
grievances. Some of these techniques are, of course, used from time to time by leaders 
not generally seen as ‘populist’ overall. Our paper elaborates further aspects of the 
populist approach to politics and its related techniques. In particular, we point to the 
use of simple narratives to corral and motivate voters to act despite facing complex 
issues involving nuanced trade-offs between different goals and interests in conditions 
of radical uncertainty. Many of these simple messages seek to provide confidence and 
reassurance and constitute what Edward Sudgen (2019) calls ‘quest narratives’ 
promising a return to ‘a simpler, more glorious past’.  Such nostalgic visions of 
returning to better and more certain times are seen in the Brexiteer slogan of ‘Take 
 
1 The Daily Mail referred to judges as ‘enemies of the people’ when the UK supreme court ruled 
that parliament should be allowed to vote on article 50; and Donald Trump has referred to 
sections of the media critical of his policies as ‘enemies of the people’. Theresa May was 
disparaging of the idea of being a ‘citizen of nowhere’ in her Tory party conference speech in 
2016.  
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Back Control’ and in Donald Trump’s favourite cry of ‘Make America Great Again’. 
The tone of many of the messages used is also divisive and polarizing – ‘you are with 
us or against us’. As such, they represent a shift in the political metanarrative away 
from consensus and compromise to a winner-takes-all world of uncontested identities 
and decisive action.2  
Our focus in section 3 on the uncertainty and disorientation endemic to late capitalist 
societies will help explain the particular appeal of these narratives. At this stage we 
note two other features of populism that contribute to the narrative coups analysed in 
section 4. The first is a tendency to engage in an arms race of rhetorical hyperbole 
where every opponent is a ‘traitor’ or ‘crooked’,3 the existing political system is a 
‘swamp’, and every achievement by the leader is the ‘greatest’ ever. The second feature 
is the efforts – made, for example, in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary4  or in Trump’s discourse 
– to crush, or vilify as ‘fake’, any parts of civil society and the media that dare to 
challenge the leader’s narrative with inconvenient factual evidence. In an 
indeterminate world where the future is partly determined by whose narrative gets to 
structure voters’ expectations and beliefs, there is a strong tendency for leaders to use 
these techniques to ensure that it is their narrative that performs the future and their 
facts that influence voters. 
 
 
2 While this paper’s examples of populist rhetoric are mostly from the political right, populist 
tendencies also exist on the left. Christopher Clarke (2019) illustrates ‘left populism’ with his 
study of the Corbyn project in the UK Labour Party. Looking beyond the exclusionary rhetoric 
of the motto ‘for the many not the few’, Clarke argues that Corbyn supporters see themselves 
as bearers of moral truths in a fight not only against a subversive elite but also against the 
moderates and ‘left pluralists’ within the party’s own ranks who would appease the forces of 
neo-liberalism and admit the need for nuanced trade-offs. The divisiveness of the message is 
matched by a narrative of returning to a past golden age of real socialism. 
3 See, for example, Trump’s continual reference to his election opponent as ‘Crooked Hillary’. 
4 These efforts include the Orbán regime’s hounding the Central European University out of 
Budapest. 
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2.2 The main drivers of the populist turn 
What are the main drivers of this populist turn? Each case is, of course, different and 
the sources of grievance various – from humiliation at the hands of victors in war 
(Germany in the 1930s) to loss of political agency as a result of external conditionality 
(Hungary in the 2000s) or euro-area austerity (Italy since 2011); and from widening 
income inequalities and the absence of median income growth (in the US and UK since 
the 1970s and especially since the financial crisis) to path-dependent cultural attitudes 
to rapidly encroaching trends of social liberalism (Poland in recent years). All these 
factors are likely to have played a part in destabilising the political status quo.  
Many authors cite structural factors in certain Western democracies as the cause of 
increased populism – such as the growing failure of political parties to exercise an 
effective ‘gatekeeping’ operation to exclude demagogues from standing for office 
(Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018) as a result of increased reliance on balloting (self-selecting 
and increasingly extreme) party memberships to determine party leadership. 
Others blame two features of what Cas Mudde (2018) calls ‘undemocratic liberalism’ 
for the illiberal and populist turn: the first is the wholesale delegation of many political 
and economic decisions to independent technocracies (like central banks) or 
multinational entities (like the EU), thereby weakening national democratic control. 
This becomes more problematic at times of crisis when the agencies to which decisions 
are delegated have to make policy choices with strong distributional effects. Secondly, 
some blame the over-arching logic of neo-liberal economic policies for situating 
economies in an interdependent and global system of mobile capital and increasingly 
deregulated labour markets that has weakened the ability of elected governments to 
protect their own workers (Zielonka 2018). In economic policy terms, western 
countries are enslaved – the argument goes – by ‘the goddess TINA – There Is No 
Alternative’ (Bronk, 1998, 220).  
Moving beyond structural factors, Jens Beckert (2019) argues that political authority 
depends on ‘promissory legitimacy’ – on the credibility of the promises about the 
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uncertain future made by leaders. In particular, neo-liberal economic policies have 
relied for their legitimacy on the promise – the imaginary – of greater prosperity and 
liberty for everyone in the wake of the liberalisation and deregulation of markets. This 
imaginary has been ‘crushed in the eyes of many by the financial crisis and years of 
median-wage stagnation’ (Bronk and Beckert, 2019, 13). But despite governments 
becoming less able in a globalised and interdependent world to deliver on their 
promises, the political response has been a noticeable inflation of ‘empty promises’ 
(Runciman, 2018, 214) during elections – a dynamic that breeds a corrosive cynicism. 
Populists, too, triumph at the ballot box by promising ‘sunlit meadows beyond’,5 but, 
pace Beckert, any failure on their part to deliver may simply strengthen their position 
since they are pre-armed with narratives of betrayal by the deep state, ‘enemies of the 
people’, or assorted ‘doomsters’. 
Another explanation for the populist turn stresses the loss of dignity and recognition 
suffered by casualties of the changeover from a Fordist system of production based in 
old industrial heartlands to the new knowledge economy, which brings agglomeration 
benefits to the large cities and university towns that attract highly skilled labour from 
around the world. Torben Iversen and David Soskice (2019) argue that ‘the old middle 
class’6 in rust-belt areas formerly derived status as well as a larger share of income 
from ‘the strong interdependencies across skill groups, neighbourhoods, and regions’ 
that were a feature of Fordist production (219). The move to the new knowledge 
economy ‘embodies the logic of agglomeration and increasing returns’ – with strong 
complementarities between highly educated and globally mobile workers and firms 
located in cities – and it disrupts the previous social contract with the ‘old middle 
class’. In countries with poor skills training across the board, income inequality rises; 
but the old middle class are not content with cash handouts paid for by tax revenues 
 
5 From Boris Johnson in a speech launching his case against membership of the EU in 2016. 
Johnson also regularly referred before the 2019 UK election to those who question his approach 
as ‘doomsters’.  
6  In English terminology, read ‘the traditional working class’ for ‘the old middle class’ in 
Iversen and Soskice’s US terminology. 
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generated in the successful cities. Instead, their perspective is often that the poor are 
‘lazy or “undeserving”, while the rich are gaming the system’; they ‘want the 
government to work for them and to restore their sense of place and pride’ (Iversen 
and Soskice, 2019, 222, 227). They also tend to resent immigrants as much for replacing 
them as essential contributors to the economy as for any real or perceived impact on 
their wages.  
Iversen and Soskice’s analysis not only helps explain a susceptibility to populist 
narratives among certain sections of the population; it also goes some way to 
explaining the distribution of populist sentiments they measure – highest in those 
demographics and nations with poor general access to high quality education and 
intra- and intergenerational mobility, and lower among educated city-dwellers and in 
coordinated market economies (like Germany and Scandinavia) with excellent 
vocational training and pre-primary education. But it is here that we have a 
complementary explanation that relates to the incidence of radical uncertainty and the 
relative ability of different groups to cope with that uncertainty. The prevalence of – 
and attitude to – uncertainty, and the degree to which facts are tribally constructed, 
help determine both the emotional and economic susceptibility of voters to populist 
narratives and the effectiveness of populist techniques in the hands of politicians. 
3.  Uncertainty and the epistemics of populism 
Liberal policy errors, the decline of promissory legitimacy, and the differential 
capacity of groups to benefit from the new knowledge economy discussed in section 2 
go a long way to explain why conditions have become more conducive to populism in 
recent years – with wide variations across different groups. We turn now to the 
epistemics of populism – how knowledge problems and belief dynamics shape options 
for both populists and their opponents. In particular, we focus on how indeterminacy 
improves the traction of populist narratives, why these narratives often prove 
bulletproof in the face of contrary evidence, and how populists encourage the tribal 
construction of facts to secure power. 
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3.1 Economic indeterminacy and the power of populist narratives 
We follow Beckert and Bronk (2018) in arguing that capitalist economies are 
characterized by relentless innovation and novelty and hence exhibit an indeterminacy 
that cannot be reduced to the sort of measurable ‘risk’ amenable to the calculation of 
objective probabilities.7 Innovations in product design, technological processes, and – 
just as importantly – in economic policy and regulatory governance break the 
predictable links between the past and the future. This ensures that the future cannot 
be a statistical shadow of the past. Furthermore, complex and innovative economic 
systems – exhibiting strong global interdependencies and increasing returns to 
agglomeration and first-mover advantage – are characterised by the continual 
emergence of novelty and second-order contingent reactions to that novelty.  
In such situations, people face a lack of knowledge, which David Dequech (2001, 920) 
calls ‘fundamental uncertainty.’ Contrary to the assumptions of rational expectations 
theory, no-one in these conditions is able to calculate the optimal course of action or 
internalise the correct model of the economy. ‘To put it simply, when the world is 
uncertain, you cannot know what the best model will be, and the past may not be a 
good guide to the future’ (Bronk, 2019).  
The incalculability and indeterminacy of the future and the corresponding uncertainty 
facing political and economic actors is to some degree a feature generated within any 
capitalist system subject to the dynamic that Joseph Schumpeter (1943 [1976]) refers to 
as ‘creative destruction’. But, crucially, the degree of disruption, indeterminacy and 
uncertainty is dependent on several factors:  
 
7 See Knight (1921) for the famous distinction between radical ‘uncertainty’ and measurable 
‘risk’.  
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• first, the mix between radical and incremental innovation in products and 
processes (since incremental innovation entails lower degrees of 
indeterminacy and ‘semantic uncertainty’8 than does radical innovation);  
• secondly, the intensity of deregulation and policy reform designed to remove 
institutional constraints that previously channelled ‘the sources of 
contingency’ (Offe, 1998, 682);   
• and thirdly, the extent of integration into globally interdependent networks, 
which undermine the efficiency of national ‘planning’ (Boyer, 2018). 
In other words, the degree of uncertainty is correlated with factors often seen as 
drivers of the populist turn – the move to a new knowledge economy (characterised 
by radical innovation especially in information technology) and policies of rapid 
deregulation and market globalisation. Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001) 
demonstrate that coordinated market economies (CMEs) rely on incremental as 
opposed to radical innovation strategies and high company-specific skills and hence 
display lower levels of income inequality and greater resistance to the sort of labour-
market deregulation that would damage investment in vocational training. These 
institutional features entail that those citizens who most benefit face lower degrees of 
personal uncertainty and economic insecurity. This may help account for the lower 
percentage of the population susceptible to populist attitudes in CMEs (according to 
data in Iversen and Soskice, 2019) than in the US, whose successful sectors engage in 
more radical innovation.9   
Zygmunt Bauman writes about the psychological and social effects of living ‘in an Age 
of Uncertainty’, where change is no longer ‘a temporary irritant’ but the result of a 
compulsive obsession with modernization and continual deregulation (2007; 2012, viii, 
xi). He memorably dubs as ‘liquid modernity’ the ‘growing conviction that change is 
 
8 ‘Semantic uncertainty’ refers here to uncertainty about the meaning of words and analogies 
used to discuss novel products or processes – see Lane and Maxfield (2005). 
9 Paradoxically, however, Germany has advocated supply-side and austerity policies that have 
helped drive populism elsewhere in the Eurozone – see Blyth (2013); Jacoby (2020). 
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the only permanence, and uncertainty the only certainty’ (2012, viii). Focusing on a 
growing divorce between power and national politics in an era of globalisation, he 
describes the feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, and debilitating fear that become 
‘self-perpetuating’ (2007, 9). It is these emotions that help explain the susceptibility of 
voters to reassuring narratives. As David Tuckett (2011, xvii) argues, narratives are 
one of the main devices that people use to ‘give meaning’ to their actions  and ‘create 
the commitment to act’. In particular, citizens use narratives to overcome the anxiety 
they experience when facing incalculable uncertainty, to ‘manage anticipations of gain 
and loss’, and to ‘support action emotionally’ (Tuckett, 2018, 74). 
In any context where people are unable to calculate the right course of action or rely 
on objective probability functions (because of the ontological indeterminacy implied 
by innovation and novelty), they have no choice but to rely on a mixture of 
imaginaries, shared narratives, and calculative technologies to form expectations and 
generate the confidence to act (Beckert and Bronk, 2018). They must imagine a future 
that cannot yet be known, but they do so with the help of a varied cocktail of shared 
stories, heuristics, and calculative devices (used as tools to diagnose emerging 
patterns).  
Crucially, since the future is yet to be created by how people imagine and will it to be, 
outcomes depend – at least in part – on which novel imaginaries and contingent 
narratives prove most influential. As Beckert and Bronk (2018, 7) write: ‘Since 
expectations are not anchored in some pre-existing future reality, but rather have an 
important role in creating the future, they are the legitimate object of political 
challenge, debate, and choice.’ Narratives are politically important not only for their 
ability to settle the expectations of the anxious but also as an instrument of power in 
shaping the future.  
Different demographic groups experience the uncertainty arising from the globalised 
knowledge economy in different ways. This variation may help explain who is most 
susceptible to populist narratives promising a return to past glorious certainties that 
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will privilege a country’s authentic citizens. Beckert and Bronk (2019, 13f) argue that 
‘one of the inherent promises of capitalist systems is that the uncertainty implied by 
Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” – or Ulrich Beck’s “whirlpool of change” (Beck, 
1992) – is merely the unwelcome flipside of a cherished freedom to choose among 
newly imagined options and transcend the shackles of the past.’ But those currently in 
a position to exploit this freedom are predominantly highly educated, young, and 
resident in large or university cities. Meanwhile, the costs of associated rapid social 
dislocation tend to fall most heavily on the old Fordist middle classes and those with 
few educational resources. It is also generally accepted that the elderly are more loss 
averse than the young and more uncomfortable with rampant innovation and 
associated rapid changes in social and cultural norms. It should, therefore, come as no 
surprise that the two most reliable indicators of a propensity to vote for Brexit and the 
populist narrative of ‘take back control’ in the 2016 referendum were old age and a 
lack of tertiary education.10 The uncertainty implied by the new global economy was 
much less threatening to Millennials. In this respect at least, the young and educated 
were happy with the status quo of British membership of the EU. 
Ironically, of course, narratives that promise radical change as well as greater hope 
and control for those who are disadvantaged by the status quo and anxious about the 
future will – if influential – be disruptive and bring further uncertainty to the system. 
This was arguably the fate of the Brexiteer message of ‘take back control’: far from 
reducing uncertainty and increasing agency for the disadvantaged as it promised, its 
success in ‘performing’ the future considerably increased economic and political 
uncertainty. The vote to take back control hurtled the country at least temporarily out 
of control. 
 
10 For the age demographics of the Brexit vote in	2016,	see	:	
https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/06/27/how-britain-voted.		Over	
65s	were	twice	as	likely	to	vote	for	Brexit	as	under	25s,	and	those	with	a	degree	more	than	twice	
as	likely	to	vote	to	remain	in	the	EU.	Big	cities	overwhelmingly	backed	‘remain’,	while	small	
towns,	former	industrial	areas,	and	rural	counties	voted	‘leave’. 
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3.2 Distrust of experts and the loss of hard-fact constraints 
A surprising feature of the recent populist turn in the UK and US is the growing 
distrust of experts and the apparent imperviousness of populist narratives to fact-
checking websites and media. Several factors are at play here.  
The first and perhaps most important is that the credibility of experts has been 
damaged by the misuse of economic models to make forecasts of unwarranted 
precision at times of great uncertainty. Economists have increasingly allowed their 
specialist expertise to be expressed in the form of forecasts of the unknowable future. 
The future is not entirely uncertain, of course: some aspects of social reality are 
predictable thanks to systematic regularities in behaviour and stable constraints. But 
large parts of the economy and politics are inherently indeterminate thanks to continual 
innovation, novelty, increasing returns, and threshold effects. In these areas, the aim 
of predicting the future with deterministic models and probability forecasts based on 
historical data is a fools’ errand. The refusal of the economics profession to take 
uncertainty (as distinct from measurable ‘risk’) seriously has left them exposed in the 
court of public opinion (Blyth, 2002). 
Not all the fault here lies with economists. Those who employ them like the illusion of 
control that any pretence to know the future implies; and they often want to justify 
their decisions and avoid blame for mistakes by delegating judgment to black box 
models promising to solve the equations of life (Power, 2007). But the net effect of the 
continual failure of high-profile forecasts to predict the future with any precision has 
been a serious loss of credibility for the experts who produce them. As a result, large 
sections of the public have understandably started to undervalue other aspects of their 
expertise – such as their knowledge of causal mechanisms or sensitive threshold 
effects. This is damaging to public debate because the inability to forecast accurately 
uncertain futures emphatically does not imply that experts have no clue about the 
future. Indeed, their analytical tools and models are highly useful in helping us spot 
emerging patterns. Experts – particularly those willing to use a variety of models – 
remain a key asset for learning how to navigate the unknown future.  
The epistemics of populism 
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The indeterminacy of complex and innovative modern economies characterised by 
frequent novelties and non-linear reactions self-evidently makes it impossible to 
ground political narratives in uncontested facts about the future. We genuinely cannot 
know ex ante what the future will look like. By reducing the constraints normally 
imposed by an audit of facts on the set of plausible narratives, the indeterminacy of 
the future also leaves narrative entrepreneurs free to invent future scenarios (such as 
the United Kingdom prospering more outside the EU’s Single Market than within) 
without facing the possibility of firm refutation. Furthermore, populists tend to 
represent sceptical questioning about the feasibility of their imaginaries as the product 
of ‘project fear’ or ‘fake news’. Indeed, feeding off legitimate doubt about misleadingly 
precise predictions or risk assessments of the unknowable future, populists instill a 
dangerous cynicism about all facts and theoretical models presented by experts. This 
matters since, however uncertain the future, there remain hard constraints and 
established causal mechanisms that are relevant to judging the likelihood of different 
outcomes.11  
Another factor limiting the influence of expert analysis is that the public frequently 
mistakes correlation for causation in a form of understandable mental association. So, 
for example, increases in immigration, improved minority rights, and the ethnic 
diversity of the workforce may be loosely correlated with rising income inequality and 
depressed median wages for the old middle classes in the US over the last fifty years, 
and this correlation may consciously or unconsciously trump most expert analysis 
suggesting that other factors (such as global capital movements, technological change, 
and reduced union power) are a larger determinant. Likewise, it is true that the period 
of UK membership of the EU correlates with the decline in manufacturing in the North 
 
11  An example of a well-established causal mechanism that casts legitimate doubt on the 
imaginary of the UK gaining from replacing Single Market membership with close trading 
links with the US and Asia is captured by the gravity model of trade: trade is done most easily, 
cheaply, and profitably with countries in close proximity. 
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of the country. It is plausible that this association plays its part in making voters 
susceptible to anti-EU narratives.   
The confusion of correlation with causation is part of larger problem identified by 
Hannah Arendt (2006, 239): she argues that very often ‘factual truth is no more self-
evident than opinion’, while opinion-holders ‘find it relatively easy to discredit factual 
truth as just another opinion.’ This is because reality is often counter-intuitive and 
highly inconvenient leaving us inclined to believe alternative ‘facts’ that suit our 
normative priors or emotional dispositions. As Arendt (247) puts it: 
 Since the liar is free to fashion his “facts” to fit the profit and pleasure, or even 
 the mere expectations, of his audience, the chances are that he will be more 
 persuasive than the truthteller. Indeed, he will usually have plausibility on his 
 side; his exposition will sound more logical, as it were, since the element of 
 unexpectedness – one of the outstanding characteristics of all events – has 
 mercifully disappeared.  
Expert analysis is often ranged against the apparent common sense and emotionally 
appealing nature of populist narratives.  
3.3 Power and the tribal construction of facts 
It is a central tenet of post-Kantian thought that the world we see and the evidence we 
use are partly constructed by the conceptual grids our minds supply (Bronk, 2009). We 
never have unmediated access to brute reality but rely on theories, narratives, 
metaphors, and concepts to structure our vision and analysis. The data we use is 
framed and selected by the contingent models and stories we consciously or 
unconsciously internalise. As M. H. Abrams (1953, 31) noted – and as the etymology 
of the word ‘facts’ (derived from the Latin facta) implies – facts are ‘things made as 
much as things found, and made in part by the analogies through which we look at 
the world as through a lens.’ In other words, ‘facts are not some objective touchstone 
for assessing the truth-value’ of different narratives and theories; instead they are part-
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creations of particular stories and theories (Bronk and Jacoby, 2016, 12). This 
emphatically does not mean that we cannot reason about and debate the relative 
merits of different constructions of evidence as useful encapsulations of the aspects of 
reality that matter to us. But, in a post-Kantian and post-modern world, all facts are 
provisional constructions and partial interpretations of reality. 
Many thinkers from Thomas Kuhn (1996) – with his theory of incommensurable 
paradigms – to David Bohm have worried about the implications for science and 
policy of researchers being locked within disciplinary silos and a variety of discrete 
and contingent linguistic or narrative frames that break our ‘field of awareness into 
disjoint parts’ (Bohm, 1996, 76). But it is the French post-modernist social theorists who 
have best articulated the analogous implications for politics. Michel Foucault, in 
particular, analysed the relationship between knowledge and power: in his vision, 
power depends on the ‘production of truth’, and knowledge is partly the product of 
contingent power relations. As he puts it: power ‘produces reality; it produces 
domains of objects and rituals of truth’ (Foucault, 1977, 194; quoted in McHoul and 
Grace, 1993, 64).  
The disquieting implications for politics are twofold: first, politics becomes a battle of 
warring narratives in which the very categories and conceptual frameworks with 
which we interpret evidence are hotly contested. Purveyors of official ‘facts’ are seen 
as embedded in existing power structures that determine the analytical frames used; 
and insurgent power belongs to those who can craft a newly compelling narrative or 
interpretive frame and hence create the evidential base on which their political 
platform may depend. The essence of power becomes to control the conceptual and 
normative frameworks by which the leader’s supporters interpret the world and 
decide how to vote.  
Secondly, as we lose nationally coherent narrative or cultural frames and widely 
accepted systems of accredited expertise, partisan politics generates fragmented 
notions of truth and an increasingly tribal construction of facts. Lilliana Mason (2018) 
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demonstrates, for example, how US political parties are increasingly ‘sorted’ by racial 
and religious identity in ways that minimize cross-cutting cleavages. As a result, 
partisan identities are far more powerful incubators of anger than in the past. Even 
when members of different camps are close in policy terms, they are extremely angry 
at one another – hence her title: Uncivil Agreement. This anger helps explain why 
partisans respond readily to the message of ‘winning’ and are more likely to reject 
notions of trade-offs or win-win propositions. 
Moreover, the longer partisans stay in their own echo chambers, the more they occupy 
different mental worlds and are no longer able to see the same things as their co-
citizens in other camps. Cutting-edge neuroscience research confirms that people’s 
perceptions are structured by concepts: the particular concepts they use shape what 
they see, and any conceptual structures regularly used harden over time (Feldman 
Barrett, 2018). Analogously, we suggest that as political belief-structures drift apart – 
partly through the party and media polarization noted above – citizens are 
increasingly unable to see the same things or enter the same emotional states. Those 
in different cognitive tribes are less and less able to agree on the basic facts in a 
particular situation, and the overarching narratives in relation to race, crime, and 
economics diverge according to party allegiances.  
4. The politics of uncertainty 
The epistemics of populism outlined in section 3 – in particular the impossibility of 
predicting the indeterminate future in innovative and interconnected economies, the 
emotional and cognitive disorientation this implies, and the increasingly tribal 
construction of facts – also enable us to sharpen the discussion about the nature of 
populist politics and the efficacy of particular populist techniques. 
4.1 Indeterminacy, complexity, and the blame game 
 A key feature of populist discourse is to blame negative outcomes on outsiders – 
whether the supposedly self-serving elite, foreigners, or particular ethnic groups 
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within society – who (in the terms of the discourse) are excluded from the ‘real people’. 
Blame does, of course, legitimately attach to certain actors from time to time. But it is 
a feature of complex systems and innovative economies that it is often hard 
scientifically to ascribe blame specifically to individuals. Complex networks of 
interdependent firms, institutions, and citizens reacting in often creative and 
contingent ways to each other’s innovative moves are frequently characterised by 
snowballing effects as certain financial or environmental thresholds are crossed; and 
contagious epidemics of panic or euphoria often sweep through whole political and 
economic systems. This means that – just as the consequences of any individual’s 
action are usually ex ante indeterminate and unpredictable because they depend on the 
creative and contingent reactions of others and non-linear threshold effects – so, too, 
it is frequently impossible retrospectively to define who precisely is to blame. Bad 
outcomes (like the financial crash and the recession that followed) are emergent 
properties of a whole system and seldom the creation of one small group, still less an 
individual.  
Mary Douglas (1992) argued that modern societies, no less than primitive tribes, are 
characterised by a human tendency to ascribe blame to certain individuals or groups 
– especially an outside enemy – for misfortunes that would otherwise be inexplicable 
and even more emotionally threatening. Disasters, she argued ‘are generally turned to 
political account: someone already unpopular is going to be blamed for it’ (Ibid., 5). 
She saw communities as organized by various schemas of explanation and blaming as 
one route to establishing ‘community consensus’ (Ibid., 8).  As she puts it: 
Blaming is a way of manning the gates and at the same time of arming the guard. 
News that is going to be accepted as true information has to be wearing a badge 
of loyalty to the particular political regime which the person supports; the rest is 
suspect, deliberately censored or unconsciously ignored (Douglas, 1992, 19). 
Douglas also argued that, in the politicized search for scapegoats to blame for 
misfortune, anyone ‘who insists that there is a high degree of uncertainty is taken to 
Richard Bronk and Wade Jacoby 
 19 
be opting out of accountability’ (Ibid.,30). In practice, of course, it is the very 
indeterminacy of economic systems, the unfathomable contingency of events, and the 
difficulty of establishing blame forensically in complex systems that gives populists 
the freedom to ascribe blame to whichever opponent or group suits their tribe-
reinforcing aims. This is often accomplished through the stirring up of conspiracy 
theories which constitute a core ‘logic of populism’ (Runciman, 2018, 65).  
Importantly, the populist blame game does not work only on those with pre-existing 
populist attitudes. Busby, Gubler and Hawkins (2019) have investigated populist 
rhetoric in an online experimental setting. They found that asking U.S. respondents 
who (rather than what) was responsible for national difficulties primed populist 
responses and increased the inclination to vote for populist candidates. When 
problems are framed in what they call ‘dispositional’ terms that attribute political 
failures to individuals, respondents are more likely to have a populist response than 
when such problems are framed as ‘situational.’ Busby et al show that this tendency is 
in fact strongest for those respondents with the weakest underlying populist attitudes, 
suggesting the populist blame game can be effective in expanding populist vote 
shares. 
4.2 The promise of certainty and appeal to common sense 
We argue that populists exploit uncertainty by crafting simple messages and 
narratives that respond to the fear, anxiety, and anger that uncertainty induces in their 
followers. These messages may help voters make sense of otherwise disorienting 
events, or they may play on fears and anxieties to stir up anger. At the same time, the 
openness of the indeterminate future – the flipside of uncertainty – frees populists to 
promote imaginaries of a rosy future under their leadership or dystopias that would 
flow from ‘elite’ rule. Both types of imaginary can motivate their base without the 
possibility of incontrovertible and immediate refutation by sceptics.  
Yet if uncertainty is the oil lubricating the populist machine, it does not feature as a 
major trope in populist discourse. Rather, populist narratives are normally designed 
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as an antidote to uncertainty: they promise certain outcomes based on allegedly 
incontrovertible logic or ‘common sense’. They present a single over-arching theme, 
propose a single mission around which their followers can rally, and promote a unified 
identity for true believers. Populists rarely admit that the future – under their tutelage 
– would still be uncertain; nor do they allow for nuanced analysis of risks. So, for 
example, the Johnson-Cummings UK election campaign motto in 2019 of ‘Getting 
Brexit Done’ and ending ‘the dither and delay’ promised voters a route out of 
uncertainty that would end the need for further agonising over the decision of whether 
or not to leave the EU and finally allow the UK to ‘achieve its full potential’. 
Similar promises of a purportedly certain course of action are a common populist 
trope. For example, linguistic analysis reveals a substantial rise in use of the term ‘vow’ 
in English-language media between 2015 and 2018. From a fairly steady frequency of 
30-40 occurrences per million words between 2010-2015, usage of the term surged to 
nearly 60 per million by 2018.12 A different linguistic measure – collocates – tracks the 
frequency with which the media uses certain other words in close conjunction with 
‘vow.’ From 2010-19, ‘Trump’ is the second most frequent collocate, with nearly 7000, 
easily beating ‘wedding’ (#5) and ‘marriage’ (#10).13 Populist Philippines President 
Rodrigo Duterte had nearly 1600 collocates with ‘vow.’ During the same period, the 
more conventional-sounding Hillary Clinton had only 328 collates with ‘vow’ despite 
a longer period in executive-level politics as Secretary of State and then presidential 
candidate. Populists are more frequently credited in the media with making firm 
commitments. This perception mirrors usage from their verbatim campaign speeches: 
as candidates in 2015-16, Trump was roughly eight times as likely as Clinton to use the 
 
12 The source for data in this and the next paragraph – except in relation to the ECB – is the 
NOW corpus, which contains 9.8 billion words from the global English-speaking press.  
13 The pattern is similar from June 2015 when Trump announced his candidacy. Over both 
periods, ‘Trump’ is the second most frequent collocate for ‘vow’ (both times trailing only 
‘continue’). 
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terms ‘promise’ and ‘deliver.’ Clinton, meanwhile, was eighteen times more likely 
than Trump to use 'goal’ and ’intend’. 
Populists also avoid acknowledging uncertainty. Whereas a different corpus of 7.8 
million words spoken by European Central Bank officials in public speeches since 1997 
reveals 3,379 instances of the word ‘uncertainty’, Nigel Farage’s entire career in the 
European Parliament appears to have generated just a single use of the word (in a 
speech after the 9/11 terror attacks). Ironically, this is the exact number of times – one 
– that an ECB official has used the term ‘vow’ in the relevant corpus. Analysis of over 
a half a million words from Trump’s campaign speeches reveals not a single use of 
‘uncertain’ or its derivatives. While central bank discourse readily recognises (by 
name) endemic uncertainty, populist discourse appears to ignore or even deny it. 
Populist politicians are also well aware of the understandable tendency among voters 
to confuse correlation with causation, and they often exploit this with messaging that 
links their opponents’ policies with the misfortunes plaguing their own base. Trump, 
for example, has often implied that increased immigration is to blame for the sharp 
rise in American deaths from opioids. Moreover, some populists can even help invert 
correlations in the public mind. For example, Di Carlo, Schulte-Cloos, and Saudelli 
(2018) show that Italian populist Matteo Salvini’s relentless focus on migration has 
helped generate a widespread perception of migrant-driven crime in Italy – at a time 
when both overall crime and crime committed by migrants has steadily declined.  In 
a different study, the Instituto Cattaneo (2018, 3) found that Italian respondents 
overestimated migrant presence in their country by a larger margin than anywhere 
else in Europe (the average estimate was 26% when the actual immigrant share was 9%). 
At the same time, populists specialise in narratives that seek to counter the nuanced 
arguments of experts with direct appeals (via homely analogies) to the sound common 
sense of the ordinary person.14  So, for example, the Leave campaign in 2016 inoculated 
 
14  Non-populists also use homely analogies, of course. For example, Angela Merkel’s 
‘Schwabian housewife’ is a stand-in justification for fiscal austerity. 
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voters to official warnings that Brexit would cost the economy billions as a result of 
lower GDP growth, with a focus on how useful saving the UK’s net EU budget 
contribution of £10 billion pounds would be when invested in the NHS. This message 
was reiterated ad nauseam and accompanied by rhetoric about the lack of patriotism 
shown by those determined to run down the potential of ‘the fifth largest economy in 
the world.’  
4.3 The attack on experts, the media, and independent verification of 
facts 
Populist rhetoric has also exacerbated the erosion of expert credibility.  As we have 
seen, experts – especially economists – have often failed either to predict recent crises 
or to admit the limits of their profession’s ability to forecast with precision the 
unknowable future. But this weakening of credibility has been complemented by two 
other trends that have further damaged the ability of expert knowledge to rein in the 
more fantastic elements of populist discourse. The first was predicted by Douglas 
(1992, 33), who noted that when science is used to arbitrate in political disputes about 
policy issues (or to determine blame) it risks losing ‘its independent status’. Scientists 
using their models and forecasts to support or oppose a particular party agenda or 
policy platform are often accused of partisanship. This perception of bias is then 
magnified by the second trend – the tendency for populist campaigns directly to attack 
or belittle experts. There has been no more blatant case of this than Michael Gove’s 
pronouncement in 2016 that British people ‘have had enough of experts’, who he 
accused of often coming from ‘distant’ and ‘elitist’ organisations whose members had 
done very well out of the EU.15  
In some cases, populist politicians seek to avoid media scrutiny, intimidate the media, 
or dissuade them from engaging in critical coverage by retweeting online trolling of 
journalists or threatening to close down hostile elements of the media or review their 
 
15  Michael Gove, Sky News, 3 June 2016. A recording of the key passage is available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sz1_LHtfuCI 
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public licenses. In other cases, as seen almost daily with Trump’s press briefings and 
tweets, populist leaders engage in pre-emptive strikes against the very outlets that are 
criticising the veracity of the populists’ own statements by dubbing the media in turn 
as ‘fake news’. The aim here is not in most cases to defend the truthfulness of the 
original statements but rather to feed a broader metanarrative that everyone is lying. 
In the swirl of claims and counter-claims, the public becomes understandably cynical 
about all claims to the truth. As Arendt (2008, 252) noted in her discussion of twentieth-
century programmes of brainwashing, the danger here is not so much that voters will 
believe many of the lies they are told, but that they lose their ‘bearings in the real 
world’.  
When this point is reached, populists – already freed by the indeterminacy and 
unpredictability of the future from having their imaginaries constrained by 
uncontested facts about the future – are free to use any ‘facts’ they please to suit their 
argument, while relying on emotional appeal and rhetorical exaggeration.  
Populists also appear exempt from the need for consistency. Michael Barber and 
Jeremy Pope (2019) show that candidate Trump had made both ‘liberal’ and 
‘conservative’ statements on several issues, but such position-switching cost him little. 
Strong Republican or Trump-approving respondents were most likely to ‘behave like 
party loyalists by accepting the Trump cue – in either a liberal or conservative 
direction’ (Ibid., 38). Partisanship often moved respondents against their self-
professed ideology. 
4.4 Performativity and an arms race of rhetorical hyperbole 
If populists are often free to invent ‘facts’, their appeal also rests on the assumption 
that their rhetorical vows can usher in a new reality to suit their followers. 
Because the future is indeterminate and open, its shape can be heavily influenced by 
the contingent narratives guiding thought and behaviour. In a loose sense of the word, 
political narratives (and the imaginaries they articulate) are ‘performative’: from time 
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to time, they may succeed – if internalised by sufficient people – in structuring the 
future in their own image. 16  Much more often, dominant narratives influence 
outcomes in ways that cannot be fully predicted but are still significant. By contrast, 
in the case of influential dystopias, the stories told may be ‘counter-performative’ 
(MacKenzie, 2006) – that is, they ensure that action is taken to avoid the imagined 
future. The performative and counter-performative impact of narratives makes them 
a vital tool in business, environmental campaigning, central banking, and everyday 
politics. As Runciman (2018, 83) notes, for example, the ‘disaster’ narrative developed 
by Rachel Carson in her famous book, Silent Spring, was enormously influential in 
spurring concrete action to ban DDT and safeguard fragile ecosystems in the 1960s.  
Few would tar Carson – any more than modern central bankers using forward 
guidance to cajole investors’ expectations and behaviour – with the label of label of 
being ‘populist’. So, what differentiates their use of narratives from that, say, 
exemplified by Trump’s famously dystopian inaugural address in 2017? In one sense, 
the use of the term ‘populist’ is a normative judgment on the extent to which the 
rhetoric employed is designed to focus power on the speaker for their own partisan 
political ends rather than to further the public good. But this is hardly an entirely 
objective boundary condition for a definition of ‘populism’, since populist leaders will 
almost certainly define the public good as in line with their vision of the interests of 
the people they represent. A better answer returns to the idea that populist rhetoric is 
designed to appeal to – and further the interests of – the ‘good’ people at the expense 
of a ‘bad’ elite (for examples, see Müller, 2016; Mudde, 2018; Hawkins and Kaltwasser, 
2017). 
Another way of determining whether a use of narrative is populist may be to focus on 
the degree of rhetorical hyperbole employed. Because narratives coordinate and 
influence behaviour, those competing for power or market dominance increasingly 
 
16 This is analogous to the ‘performative’ role of financial and economic models in constituting 
the very logic of structured finance markets as analysed by Donald MacKenzie (2006). 
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engage in an arms race of rhetorical hyperbole: they compete to laud their own 
achievement in the most lavish language, while denigrating their opponents in 
extreme language as ‘traitors’, ‘crooks’, or ‘madmen’. The net effect, of course, is akin 
to a crowd where some people stand on tiptoe to get a better view and nobody sees 
any better. The battle for attention and effect is not easily won, but no player can afford 
to retreat to quiet civility if they want to be heard. In turn, this lends plausibility to the 
populist argument that all politics is an ugly business, with populists no worse than 
the rest. 
4.5 Narrative coups  
An extreme tool used by populist leaders in the past was to mount a military coup in 
the name of protecting the people. But, as Runciman (2018, 40) points out, 
‘metaphorical coups’ are much more common nowadays. These include ‘executive 
aggrandisement’ (40) where leaders gradually subvert democratic institutions to 
consolidate power. In this paper, we add to the list of effective types of metaphorical 
coup with the concept of a ‘narrative coup’ – involving the epistemic rather than 
institutional takeover of a country or political party. A narrative coup takes place when 
a charismatic populist leader or campaign succeeds in capturing, reorienting, and 
subverting the sub-conscious conceptual grids and normative frames with which 
voters interpret events and construct the evidence needed to make decisions. Through 
an often ruthless and lengthy campaign of eliminating or crowding out competing 
discourses, such coups – when successful – insidiously alter the world views of a 
significant segment of the population to such an extent that they become incompatible 
and incommensurable with other world views. In this way, narrative coups eliminate 
the possibility of consensus and entrench a deep polarization of outlook. They enable 
leaders to induce a deep sense of anger and unease in their voting base and engineer 
grievances where none previously existed, as well as exploiting or exaggerating 
existing grievances to boost voter support. 
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The techniques employed in such narrative coups are not purely or even largely at the 
level of national-campaign rhetoric.17 Rather, populist parties and leaders orchestrate, 
encourage, or turn a blind eye to widespread and decentralized campaigns of 
misinformation. 18  They also engage increasingly in the microtargeting (via social 
media) of a cocktail of different messages aimed at groups that are judged from web-
data analytics and demographic data to be particularly susceptible to the image, idea, 
or language chosen. The result can be that the followers of a given leader or party are 
themselves divided in outlook and belief-set but all subject to a degree of cognitive 
manipulation. 
5. Conclusion and remedies 
This paper has examined the importance of the indeterminacy of modern capitalist 
economies – and the corresponding personal uncertainty, anxiety, and disorientation 
facing voters – in explaining their susceptibility to simple populist narratives that 
promise a return to better and more certain times. It has also examined how 
uncertainty and the tribal construction of facts help increase the efficacy of populist 
political techniques. Finally, the paper uses these ideas to help understand the 
geographic and demographic distribution of populist sentiments.  
Using institutional checks to limit populist power may work in some settings, but 
populists have often proven willing and able to undo such safeguards and undermine 
 
17 Trump’s technique is unusual in depending largely on a personal mission to occupy a large 
section of the national new cycle on most days through a sustained campaign of often eye-
catching tweets.  
18 Emmanuel Macron was the victim in 2017 of a now classic piece of misinformation when 
misleadingly spliced images from two different occasions appeared to suggest that he washed 
his hands after shaking hands with some factory workers. In fact, he wiped his hands having 
handled an eel when meeting fishermen on an earlier occasion. For details, see: 
https://observers.france24.com/en/20170427-debunked-macron-didn-immediately-wash-
hands-after-meeting-workers 
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their country’s constitution for their own ends. Countering the populist turn will 
therefore require a range of efforts beyond institutional checks.  
The themes raised here suggest that nations wanting to avoid or reverse the populist 
turn seen over the last fifteen years need to concentrate on five broad areas.  
• First, they need to find ways either to limit uncertainty by reducing 
deregulation, innovation, or global integration or to ameliorate it through a 
combination of social insurance and increased investment in the sort of tertiary 
education and occupational skills that equip citizens to face uncertain futures 
with confidence.  
 
• Part of limiting uncertainty is to avoid the sort of revolutionary policy change 
that leads to unforeseen consequences and makes voters more susceptible to 
populist narratives by increasing the indeterminacy of a socio-economic 
system. For this reason, we would support Karl Popper’s call for ‘piecemeal’ 
social engineering that allows for a cautious experimental approach to policy 
reform and ‘continuous readjustments’ (Popper, 1945 [1962], 163). Piecemeal 
reform need not be conservative (Unger, 1987). 
 
• The third priority is to bolster the role of politically neutral and science-based 
state- and civil-society organisations in gathering and disseminating 
information in order to provide some common frames of reference through 
which citizens can structure their policy debates (Lewis, 2018).  
 
• Another imperative is to find non-exclusionary narratives of hope and 
reassurance framed in non-inflammatory language that can nevertheless 
inspire confidence, assuage anxieties, and engage the emotions of citizens in 
the project of building a more inclusive society. In conditions of uncertainty, 
emotions play too important a role in decision-making to be ignored by non-
populist leaders. 
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• Finally, political institutions, and cultures need to remember Plato’s injunction 
that dialogue is a better route to the truth than rhetoric. 
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